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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
A New Maritime Strategy: Admiral Mullen’s Challenge
DURING OUR CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM this past June, Admiral
Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, called for the de-
velopment of a new maritime strategy and asked that the Naval
War College take on the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the Naval
Postgraduate School, the Naval Academy, and other organizations in the strategy-
development process. The Naval War College has been the spawning ground for
American naval strategy since its opening in 1884. Combining high-level profes-
sional military education with consistent institutional commitment to research,
analysis, and gaming has created the conditions—academic freedom coupled
with a keen sense of academic responsibility and a spirit of objective inquiry—
that have produced first-class strategists and many of the most influential con-
cepts, plans, and strategies in the U.S. Navy’s history. Today, Navy leadership has
again turned to the College for help in crafting a new maritime strategy to deal
with the complex and challenging global geostrategic environment that has
emerged since the 9/11 attacks.
Why is a new maritime strategy needed? I believe that there are more than
sufficient new strategic challenges manifesting themselves since 9/11—indeed,
since the fall of the Berlin Wall—to require a fundamental rethinking of the tra-
ditional tenets of seapower that most policy makers and strategists still hold as
truisms. It is clear, for instance, from language in the National Security Strategy
that the seas no longer represent the definitive strategic barriers they once did.
Losing this most important geostrategic source of depth reduces the time avail-
able for deliberate, diplomatic response options by our national command au-
thority. Yet, the U.S. Navy has been the guarantor of national strategic depth
since the age of Teddy Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet. Should the Navy
focus on reestablishing this particular relative advantage? Should the sea be the
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medium by which preemptive counter-force operations are made more respon-
sive, or should we be working to establish the lost strategic depth through
achievement of global maritime awareness? The doctrinal legacy of “. . . From
the Sea” suggests the former, while the organizing principle referred to as “a
Thousand-Ship Navy” suggests the latter. Is the choice limited to “either/or,” or
must we do both? Options need to be clarified and choices made: a coherent
maritime strategy is required to establish the ways, means, and resources to rees-
tablish strategic depth. Again, this is just one example of the sort of questions
that emerge from a comprehensive discussion of grand strategy.
There is another reason that a maritime strategy is necessary at this point in
time. The changing nature of warfare is forcing all services to conduct a reexam-
ination of their structure and doctrine. This is happening in the world of the
Global Information Grid, where information appears to be the most valuable
warfighting resource. The result is a premium on obtaining, analyzing, and dis-
tributing information via new, more capable means of command and control. In
this environment, traditional roles and missions become fungible and open for
renegotiation. However, if we make roles-and-missions decisions simply on the
basis of emerging technical capabilities, we may back our way into serious
warfighting seams in the future. The logic of an overarching strategy is needed in
order to make sense of novel, emerging technical capabilities, operating con-
cepts, and organizing principles as part of a coherent and ultimately more effec-
tive whole. A broadly understood maritime strategy would provide a powerful
logic for roles and missions relating to all our maritime partners.
The U.S. Navy has a long and successful history of articulating national mari-
time strategies, since the founding of the Naval War College. Starting with Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s seminal work The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), the
Navy has generally crafted a new strategy when the flow of world events made it
clear that one was needed. The prospect of a trans-isthmian canal, for example,
and the rise of Germany and Japan as great naval powers provided much of the
impetus for Mahan’s pioneering work. In the 1930s, in response to the increased
chances of a war with Japan, the Navy developed a trans-Pacific strategy that even-
tually brought success in World War II. In the Cold War, the Navy aligned itself
with the nation’s grand strategy of containment and deterrence and created ele-
ments of its force structure that could support nuclear warfighting if deterrence
failed. As the Cold War matured, the viability of nuclear weapons as warfighting
weapons deteriorated, and the Navy developed the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s
to provide a foundational logic of conventional warfighting using its forces in a
forward, offensive manner. After the Soviet Union fell, the Navy morphed the
strategy of early, forward operations into a littoral warfighting doctrine.
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The Naval War College has fully embraced the challenge laid down by Admi-
ral Mullen and is proceeding at full speed to put in place a process that is intellec-
tually rigorous and accommodates ideas from around the fleet, around the
country, and around the world. We plan to move forward in an integrated fash-
ion with the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, and with early, close involve-
ment with our other joint-service and agency partners.
We will also involve our international maritime partners. The College has
been an effective forum for international naval cooperation over the years, and
we intend to take it a step farther via international participation in the maritime
strategy development process. Given the objective of a secure international
commons for legitimate commerce, regional peace and stability, and the general
benefit and progress of all mankind, this approach to strategy is timely and ap-
propriate to the international community’s growing appreciation of the unique
contributions maritime collaboration makes to these objectives.
The fundamental philosophy underpinning the College’s development effort
is that any maritime strategy must derive from and support national policy and
grand strategy. We intend to consider a range of potential grand strategies. By
examining the range of maritime strategies suggested by them, we hope to un-
derstand the fundamental strategic imperatives of any maritime strategy. More-
over, since any U.S. national grand strategy is necessarily global, this approach
promotes maritime thinking in global terms. Also, this approach helps keep the
level of discussion and analysis elevated—that is, it keeps workshop and war-game
participants from immediately focusing on ship types, deployment patterns, and
operational concepts. These topics have all but governed the dialogue on the fu-
ture of the Navy for a number of years and have generated differing points of
view that cannot be resolved without an overarching strategic logic.
We expect that logic to emerge from a competition of ideas. That competition
must reflect expert, diverse perspectives and must be based on disciplined and
objective analysis—something for which the College has established a sound
reputation. In order to establish rigor, and also to increase the odds of obtaining
genuinely creative thinking, we are going to conduct a novel type of exploratory
war game in which “Blue” players representing the United States and interna-
tional partners react to well-developed “Red” strategies to create a composite of
the future plans for a number of what we term “strategic entities.” The outcome
will be an understanding of the dynamics of strategic challenge-and-response
cycles. Follow-on workshops will synthesize key insights and conclusions into
candidate maritime strategies. These strategies will then be subjected to addi-
tional perspective and analytic scrutiny to clarify strategic options for Navy
leadership.
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The U.S. Navy developed a highly successful maritime strategy in the 1930s
and again in the 1980s in response to specific threats. Today, our task is far more
complex, as the distinction between friend and foe is not as clear and the world is
faced with numerous insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and regional competition
among states. What some writers term the “super-empowered individual”—a
person or group capable of inflicting strategic harm on a nation via advanced
technology—adds significant new complexity to strategy making. This height-
ens the importance of bringing a rigorous, intellectual approach to strategy
development.
The need for a new maritime strategy is manifest, and Admiral Mullen’s call
for one is both timely and compelling. Many institutions and organizations are
responding to his appeal, and the Naval War College is serving as a clearing-
house for the ideas emerging from their efforts. The College will also serve as
guarantor of rigor and subjectivity, fulfilling this critical institutional role of in-
tellectual conscience for the Navy.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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